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2 1.  Introduction 
The  defence-related  industries  arc  facing  an  economic and  political  context which  IS 
changing completely and calls for responses going beyond the national level. 
The end of the cold war, considerably reducing the security risk to  Europe, has made it 
possible  to  cut  military  budgets  and  step  up  the  moves  to  convert  the  industries 
concerned.  The  need  f(Jr  the  defence-related  industries  to  scak down  their  activities 
substantially has had a significant direct impact, hoth on employment in this sector which 
has  f~tllcn  by  ]7'% from  I.C1  million  to  I  lllillion  since  I  <JX4,  particularly hitting Cl:rtain 
regions,  and  also  on  the  manufacturing  base  and  innovation  capacity  of  European 
industry  as  a  whole.  Over this  period  the  economic  problems  have  persisted,  if not 
worsened;  they stem  not only from  the cuts  in  military expenditure but also  from  the 
fiercer international competition and, above all, from the anachronic fragmentation of the 
defence markets in  Europe. 
A change of attitude in favour of action by the Union is therefore emerging.  On the one 
hand, the crisis in the industry has prompted industrialists and industrial policymakcrs in 
the Member States to encourage the Union, particularly the Commission, to assume its 
responsibilities.  On  the  other,  the  measures  taken  on  the  Western  European  Union 
(WEU) and  on  the  second  pillar of the  Maastricht Treaty  have  opened  up  paths  for 
establishing a  European armaments policy.  In  particular, on  30 June 1995 an informal 
group  of EU/WEU  experts  produced  a  report  setting  out  options,  suggestions  and 
recommendations for such a European armaments policy.  In .July  1995, Corcpcr set up an 
ad  hoc interdisciplinary working party to identify areas for action by  the llnion.  To this 
end,  it  will  have  to  make  recommendations  on  the  f(lllow-up  within  the  Community 
framework or under thl: common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and, should the need 
arise, suggest specific measures without pr~judice to  the Commission's powers under the 
Treaty establishing the  European Community.  This communication is a contribution to 
this work. 
The causes of the difficulties facing the defence-related industries arc partly economic 
and partly political.  Consequently, both these aspects must be taken into account when 
analysing  the  problems  specific  to  these  industries  and  when  formulating  possible 
European action. 
However,  although  a  global  approach  to  this  subject  is  clearly  important,  the 
establishment of a  European security and  defence  identity  is  nevertheless a  long-term 
process.  On the other hand, the state of health of the defence-related industries is such 
that unless action is  taken in time, there is  a danger that whole sectors of the economy 
involved in  defence-related activities could disappear,  with  further  massive job losses, 
particularly considering the fiercer international competition. 
This urgently calls for an appropriate European response. 
Moreover, the introduction of mechanisms based on economic efficiency, particularly in 
procurement policies, will allow more rational usc of budgetary resources, yielding very 
substantial savings.This will  entail  significant savings for  the tax  paycr.According to a 
study these savings could vary between 5 to  11  billion ECUS a year. 
3 Setting out from this need fix action, this communication places the emphasis on action 
based on the existing Community instruments and, hence, concerning fields in  which the 
European  Community has  powers and  experience of its  own.  These means of action 
could possibly  he  used  in combination  with  the  CFSP.  Consequently,  they  could  be 
implemented in the short term as an initial response to the problems facing the defence-
related industries and as a first contribution towards the process of building a  European 
security and defence identity. 
The  approach  followed  by  the  Commission  is  based  on  the  principles  set  out  in  its 
communication on "An industrial competitiveness policy for the European Union" (COM 
(94) 319; 14 Septcm  bcr I 994 ). 
2. The challenges 
In  the years ahead the European Union must meet a series or challenges with a  view to 
establishing  a  European  security  and  dclence  identity  and  maintaining  a  competitive 
technology and industrial base.  The survival or these industries depends on this capacity 
to put in place a consistent strategy to respond to these challenges. 
2.1.  Economic ami industrial challenges 
2.1.1.  Industrial structure and trends 
The annual  output or dclencc equipment in  the  European  Union  is  currently worth an 
estimated  ECU  50  billion  which  is  about  3  percent  of total  industrial  output.  It  is 
somewhat less than half the US  dclencc industrial output. A growing number of defence-
related  technologies,  components  and  services  have  both  civilian  and  military 
applications. This development has made it  increasingly di flicult to <kline the boundaries 
of "dclence-related industry" and  has  made the  isolation of dclencc from  civil  industry 
increasingly untenable. The mix  between civilian and  dclence-oriented activities varies 
from  company  to  company and  from  industry  to  industry.  In  the  European aerospace 
industry, for instance, defence activities account for about 40 percent of  turnover. 
The development and production of defence equipment currently directly occupy about 
600 000 people in the EU. Another 400 000 jobs are generated indirectly in supplier and 
service industries. 
About 70 percent of defence sales come from  the aerospace and electronics industries. 
However,  much  of the  value-added  behind  the  weapon  systems  and  other  defence 
equipment originates in companies which supply components and subsystems and which 
arc in many cases SMEs. 
About  90'Yc>  of the  EU  total  production of defence equipment is  concentrated  m  some 
Member States: France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Sweden. 
4 1\.  substantial  part  of the  European  defence  industry  is  public  or  quasi-public,  most 
notably in France, Italy and Spain (although the degree of  state control varies). 
The domestic demand for European defence equipment has been  l~tlling since 1987 when 
most  EU  Member  States  started  to  reduce  their  defence  budgets.  Total  military 
expenditure fell  by 5.3 percent in real terms between I985 and I994 as indicated in Table 
I  in  the annex, whereas the procurement of major weapons fell  by 28.5  percent in  real 
terms in the same period as indicated by Chart I  in  the annex. llowevcr, EU imports of 
m:.~jor conventional weapons from third countries have not declined correspondingly. 
The declining demand, particularly from  developing countries, has practically halved the 
global arms market over the last decade according to SIPRI statistics.
1  European industry 
has  maintained a  share of one filth  of the  world export market of major conventional 
weapons  between  the  I984-I988  period  and  I993,  but  the absolute amount  has  been 
halved in  real terms as indicated by Chart 2 in the annex.  Compared to the United States, 
however, the European Union has been losing ground. 
2.1.2.  Restructuring and competitiveness 
Industrial  restructuring  is  expected  to  continue  with  significant  capacity  reductions 
though many companies have already taken far-reaching steps. 
Restructuring 
Conversion  of  military  into  civilian-oriented  production  "at  factory  level''  is  not 
considered a feasible strategy by most companies. /\.part from  the huge investment costs 
and  di niculties of' access  f'or  rwwcomers  to  cstahl ished  ci vi I  ian  markets,  conversion  is 
hindered by  the di fkrcnce between, on the one side, production of' defence goods which 
is  driven  by  technology and government spcciOcations and,  on  the  other side,  civilian 
markets which arc mainly driven by price with marketing playing a major role. However, 
conversion in  the  sense of redeploying a  company's  R&D  base  from  defence-oriented 
work to a technically related field has proved practicable for a number of  companies with 
established non-defence activities. 
Some of the  overall  capacity  reduction  has  occurred  through  outright  liquidation  of 
defence-oriented activities in companies which have chosen either to concentrate on what 
they define as their core activities or to expand the civilian sides of  their businesses. 
More often,  however,  the  rationalization of the  European  defence  industrial  base  has 
involved some form of inter-company arrangement.  Mergers and take-overs have so far 
mainly  taken  place  within  national  borders  since  the  obstacles  to  cross-border 
acquisitions in the field of defence are still considerable. In the EU examples of national 
The arms trade  statistics  compiled and published by  SIPRI  (Stockholm  International  Peace 
Research  Institute) arc partly estimated since the official  data do not provide a  comprehensive 
picture. 
5 consolidation of defence-related industries through mergers arc numcrous.
2  Cross-border 
acquisitions,  like  GIAT  lndustrie's  take-over of the  Belgian  small-arms  producer  rN 
I Ierstal in  I 991, remain exceptional. 
In recent years the consolidation ofthc defence-related industry has advanced much faster 
in  the United States than in  Europe. Following some "mega mergers" and take-overs, the 
average size, as measured by arms sales, of the len  largest l JS  defence-related companies 
is now twi<:e  that of" the ten largest I·:!  J delence-rclated companies. 
1 
Most of the consolidation which has reduced overheads costs, excess  manuf~tcturing and 
engineering capacity has taken place within national  borders. The economic gains from 
further national consolidation arc diminishing and appear now to be much smaller than 
the potential gains from cross-border industrial integration. 
Competitiveness 
In  assessing the  overall  international  competitiveness of the  European defence-related 
industry, export performance, company profitability and technological capabilities might 
provide  some  indications  about  the  competitive  position  of  the  industry  and  its 
constituent  parts,  but  it  only  makes  sense  to  speak  about  competitiveness  for  those 
companies and products which arc actually exposed to international competition. 
Compared to the lJS industry, the EU  industry has lost ground and is  now exporting less 
than half as much as the US  industry. Many of' the shills in  relative export performances 
arc linked to  international  political events, like the end of East-West confrontation, the 
Gulf War of 1990/91  and the break-up of the Soviet Union.  Changes in  national  arms 
export policies, including export subsidies, have undoubtedly also played a role.  In  this 
context, the US industry had, thanks also to the political influence exercised to benefit it, 
started to improve its export performance vis-<1-vis  the EU industry under the relatively 
stable international political conditions ofthc 1980s. 
The abovementioned factors also suggest that part of the shift is due to changes in the 
underlying competitive positions, including the significant depreciation of the US dollar 
against European currencies since 1985, that put a  heavy burden on the competitiveness 
- In  the  UK,  a large part of the  industry  is  now grouped around  British Aerospace and GEC and 
further  concentration  has  taken  place  (the  take-over  of VSEL  - a  Barrow-based  submarine 
maker/shipbuilding company- by GEC). 
- In  Germany Daimler Benz Aerospace plays a key role. 
- In  Italy the scene is dominated by Finmeccanica. 
- In  France the national consolidation is more evenly spread between the companies 
Illustrative examples of the US restructuring and consolidation process arc: 
- Lockheed's acquisition of General Dynamics' fighter aircraft division in  1993 
- Northrop's takeover of Grumman in  1994 
- the <Jgreed merger between Lockheed and Martin Marietta in  1994, followed by the acquisition of Lora! 
in  1996 
- the recent talks between Boeing and McDonnel Douglas on a possible merger of their civil and defence 
activities ( 1995). 
6 of European  dcl'cncc-rclatcd companies. The (i7 summit in  I  lalil~tx pointed out the risks 
that  such  fluctuations  pose  to  sustainable,  non-inflationary  growth  and  the  continued 
expansion of international trade. The Ell and US arc therefore encouraged to work more 
actively  and  address  the  imbalance  of  the  lJS  dollar  versus  EU  currencies.  The 
conclusions of the  recent  transatlantic  business  dialogue  held  in  Seville  stressed  the 
importance of fostering better monetary stability. 
The  strong  competitive  position  of I JS  industry  v1s-a-vis  l~uropcan  industry  is  best 
illustrated with ligures on dctence equipment imports by individual EU  Member States, 
i.e. inclusive of intra-EU trade: 75% of imported major conventional weapons came from 
the United States in the 1988-92 period. The worsening in the competitive position of  the 
European defence-related industry results also from the bilateral EU-US trade balance for 
major conventional weapons that was 1011  in  f~tvour of the United States in the 1988-92 
period (sec Table 4 in the annex). 
f3ut  export  performance  cannot  provide  a  complete  picture  of  international 
competitiveness, particularly in a  field  where trade and procurement decisions arc rarely 
taken  on commercial and economic grounds alone.  From  a  company  perspective  the 
important test of  competitiveness is profitability. 
For the European defence-related companies the picture is mixed in this respect.  Quite a 
few  of the  large  arms-producing companies  have  lost  money  in  recent years on  their 
deiCncc-oriented activities,  some of them  over a  considerable  number of years.  Other 
companies have continued to operate profitably in  the defence field and have been rather 
successful on export markets. 
Assessing  European  industry's  technological  strengths  and  weaknesses  in  the  field  of 
defence is also difficult and somewhat subjective. The US  Department of Defence has 
tried  to  compare  US  and  European  capabilities  regarding  20  so-called  critical 
technologies.  The DoD believes that European industry docs not "significantly lead" the 
United  States in  any of the  sectors but  is  "capable of making major contributions"  in 
seven sectors. 
4 
On an overall industry level the aforementioned trade figures give a strong indication that 
the  European defence-related  industry  has  experienced a  worsening of its  competitive 
position vis-it-vis the US industry since the  I 980s. For comparable equipment, produced 
with economics of scale, the US industry tends to have better price competitiveness than 
the European industry due to a domestic market more than twice the combined size of the 
markets in the  EU Member States and about seven times the largest national European 
market. This structural advantage of the US industry increases with reductions in overall 
demand  and  with  technological  advances  and  also  with  the  persistence  in  the 
fragmentation of  the EU market. 
Machine  intelligence  and  robotics,  simulation  and  modelling,  weapon  system  environment,  air-
breathing  propulsion,  high-energy  density  materials,  composite  materials,  and  biotechnology. 
The 20 critical technologies are listed in Table 5 in  the Annex. 
7 2. 1.3.  Market fragmentation and barriers to cross-border integration 
Market fragmentation 
Since competitive strength  is  related  to  the  ability  to  exploit economics of scale,  the 
competitive position of the 1\uropcan delcncc-related  industry, as described above, can 
partly  he  explained  by  the  fragmented  state  of  the  1-:uropcan  market  li>r  dckncc 
equipment.  This  fragmentation  reflects  the  widespread  and  long-standing  practice  of 
Member States to  f~wour national suppliers or, should these be lacking, suppliers  from 
NATO countries, in their procurement of  defence equipment. 
A  real  European  market  for  defence  equipment  hardly exists  as  intra-European  trade 
amounted  only  to  3-4% of total  procurement of major conventional  weapons  by EU 
Member States  in  the  1988-92 period.  I lowever,  for  components and  sub-systems the 
market is more international. 
Market  fragmentation  has  generated  a  number  of competitive  disadvantages  for  the 
defence-related industry in the European Union: 
•  It  has  prevented  the  full  exploitation  of economics  of scale  in  the  production  of 
armaments. The limited size of national orders has made the economic viability 
of  many projects dependent on uncertain export contracts. 
•  The lack of serious competition f(>r  many domestic defence contracts has given rise to 
inefficiencies  in  the development and  production of weapon systems. This is 
particularly  the  case  when  contracts  arc  awarded  on  a  cost-plus  basis  - a 
contract f(mn which, however, is increasingly being phased out. 
•  In  international  cooperative  programmes,  which  are  more  and  more  necessary  for 
technological and economic reasons, inefficient work-sharing and "juste retour" 
between countries and their respective "domestic suppliers" have contributed to 
overcapacities and caused additional costs and have not allowed the integration 
of  national industries on the basis of  comparative advantage. 
Cross-border imlustrial integmtio11 
Various  f(mns  of cross-border  industrial  cooperation  have  existed  for  decades  in  the 
dc/cnce field: companies from different countries engage in  project-specific collaboration 
and  cooperative  joint-ventures  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  strategic  alliances  (including 
full-function joint subsidiaries).  Collaborative armaments programmes arc now the most 
common way of addressing the  prohibitive costs of purely national  approaches  to  the 
development and production of large complex weapon systems in  Europe. The largest 
European collaborative armaments project is  the Eurofighter 2000 in  which the  major 
aerospace companies from the UK, Germany, Italy and Spain participate.  Another key 
cooperative venture is developing a  new-technology European military transport aircraft 
for  the  21st century  within the EUROFLAG consortium.  five  countries  arc  currently 
participating in the Future Large Aircraft programme. Cross-border joint ventures arc another ((mn or industrial cooperation which has become 
more  common  in  the  European  dcll:nce-related  industry  since  the  I  <JXOs.  Notable 
examples  or  strategic  alliances  arc  the  relationship  between  At:rospatialc  and 
Daimler-Benz Aerospace for  the development, production and marketing of helicopters 
(Eurocopter)
5  and the planned establishment of ESI  (European Satellites  Industry) and 
EMI  (European  Missiles  Industry)  in  the  field  of missiles and  satellites  or the  recent 
acquisition by Thomson of a 25% stake in  the Spanish manufacturer of defence-related 
electronics lndra. 
Joint  ventures  arc  typically  industry-led,  but  established  with  the  consent  of the 
governments of the home countries of the companies involved.  They may be an effective 
mechanism for combining the diverse technological capabilities of different companies, 
but they  arc  less  enicicnt in  bringing down development and  production  costs and  in 
enhancing  the  overall  operational  performance  of  the  products.  International 
collaboration with the  United States or other third countries is  usually a consequence of 
"off-set" agreements in purchasing contracts with non-producer countries. 
The ability of defence-related companies in  the  EU  to  rationalize and consolidate their 
businesses through mergers or sales across borders is restricted by at least five factors: 
•  Cross-border restructuring of the defence-related industry requires, in most cases, the 
consent of governments. This is unlikely to be obtained when it  is perceived 
that  the  national  security of supply  for  crucial  defence equipment would  be 
compromised by cross-border rationalization which would reduce the national 
defence industrial base significantly or make it very specialized. 
•  The  relations  between  the  government  and  defence-related  companies  differ 
considerably between Member States. In some countries a significant part ofthe 
industry  is  owned or controlled by  the state,  in  others there  is  more distance 
between them.  This disparity is  a  harrier to  cross-border industrial  integration 
which  goes  further  than  joint  ventures.  This  situation  not  only  creates 
distortions  at  the  export  level  but  also  affects  the  development  of  intra-
European policies, particularly industrial cooperation. 
•  The arms export policies,  including arms export control  policies, 'of Member States 
differ considerably.  The  attractiveness  of a  company  as  cooperation  partner 
depends,  among  other things,  on  its  ability  to  gain  export  licences  from  its 
home government. 
•  Another  obstacle  is  the  difference  in  national  requirements  regarding  defence 
equipment, including the timing of orders and the strategic concepts for which 
the equipment is  required. Only a joint definition of operational requirements 
would completely abolish this hindrance to defence industrial integration. 
Euromissilc was the  first  significant joint-venture-like cooperative arrangement in  this field.  It was set 
up  in  1972 by Acrospatiale and MI3I3 (now part of Deutsche Aerospace). 
9 •  l;inally, there is a lack of transnational legal structures (such as the  l~uropcan Company 
Statute) ami of recognition of transnational partnerships as eligible fi>r  funding 
under national research budgets. 
2.1.4.  Tcchnulngical synergies hctwccn civil :md defence :1cfivitics 
The action  hy  the  l·:uropL:an  l Jnion  to  l;tcilitatL:  intL:gration  ol dekncL:-n:latL:d  industrial 
activitiL:s will havL: to take account not only of the specific naturL: of the armaments sector 
hut also of its essential and ever closer links with the civil sector (dual-use technologies, 
components,  products  and  production  installations)  in  order  to  encourage  the 
development  of technological  and  industrial  synergies  between  these  two  sectors  at 
European level. 
Traditionally it has been argued that deiCnce R&D generates externalities in the form of 
innovations for  the  benefit of the  civilian side of the  economy (the  "spin-off' effect). 
Since  the  1960s,  however,  the  relationship  between  defence  and  civil  activities  has 
changed:  the  defence-related  industry  is  increasingly  relying  on  the  technological 
dynamism of the civil sector by  making more usc of the technologies, components and 
products of civil origin (the "spin-in" effect). With defence R&D and production making 
up a smaller and smaller part of high technology activity, technological  performance is 
coming to depend increasingly on firms' success in  managing the  intcrl~tcc between civil 
and defence technology. They have to become more adept at assimilating civil  hardware 
and sollwarc into defence equipment, at organizing R&D programmes around dual-usc 
technologies and at transmitting knowledge and expertise across the civil-defence divide. 
Defence-related  companies which  operate  in  both  civil  and  defence  markets  have  an 
interest  and  important  role  to  play  in  exploiting  civil-defence  synergies.  A  growing 
number of them arc doing so, overcoming the separation between their civil and defence 
activities;  but still  too  often,  such  separation  remains an  impediment to  synergies  in 
companies  which  have  entered  into  European  strategic  alliances  for  their  civilian 
activities but not yet lor their defence-related activities.  Furthermore, inter-firm synergies 
need also to be encouraged within and itcross borders. 
The promotion of a dual-usc approach has  been,  fi.>r  several years, a  m<~jor o~jcctivc of' 
US  research  and  defence  procurement  policies,  and  is  leading  to  a  more  integrated 
defence-civil technology and industrial base.  The overall European defence R&D effort, 
which accounts f(>r only one third of that in  the l JS,  is decreasing and comparatively more 
fragmented.  It is  therefore essential,  if Europe  is  to  preserve a  technology base and a 
research  capability  (particularly  its  teams  of researchers)  which  arc  competitive  and 
sufticicntly  autonomous,  that  not  only  the  efficiency  of its  defence  R&D  efforts  is 
improved through more systematic cooperation and greater interdependency, but also that 
it  derives maximum benefits from  its civil R&D efforts through increased  civil-defenc~ 
synergies. 
Action  is  being  taken,  to  different  extents  in  different  Member  States,  to  promote 
technological  synergies between civil  and defence activities.  This needs to  be  pursued 
and strengthened, including at the  European level, to optimize the overall use of R&D 
10 resources  and  to  f~tcilitatc  the  restructuring  or  diversification  of  defence-related 
industries. One good example of such convergence is space-related activities. One good 
example of such convergence arc space-related activities. The space indl!stry displays a 
great degree of common ground between military and civil applications. In  that respect, 
the  US  industry  has  long  benefited  from  defence  programmes  as  a  springboard  into 
commercial applications in  space. The desirable synergies, which arc of great importance 
to  Luropc,  willlx: identified in a f(Jrthcoming comnHmication on space. 
2. 2.  Politic~tl ancJ security challenges 
2.2.1.  The European security ancJ cJcfcncc identity 
The changes in the international context and the strategic prospects opened up by the end 
of the cold war call for a review of all the leading players' security poli~ies. A process of 
restructuring defence has started at both national and multilateral levels. In the long term, 
this  process  should  ensure  better  usc  of security  resources  and  a  parallel  massive 
reduction in defence budgets. 
Europe's security depends on western  European countries' capacity to  form a  centre of 
stability and integration. On the one hand, the spread of economic well-being and the 
gradual admission into the European Union of all  European countries which wish to join 
arc key ingredients of  stability through integration. On the other, the progress made by the 
Union  towards establishing a  fully  fledged  common  foreign  and  security policy is  the 
second  keystone  for  such  a  centre of stability.  Deepening of the  European  Union,  to 
include a  defence policy in  the  long term,  is  therefore a  priority.  Close cooperation on 
armaments  is  a  key  l~tclor  in  defence  policy.  The  llnion  must  not  only  implement a 
common foreign and security policy hut also develop an armaments policy, all  the more 
so  since some of the  Member States arc  amongst the  largest  producers, exporters and 
buyers of  defence-related products. 
In  this context, Community instruments, adjusted if need be, could be used in respect of 
the defence-related industries. These instruments could, in  particular, be adapted in  the 
light  of the  security  needs  and  of the  political  guidelines  to  be  defined  within  the 
framework ofthe CFSP. 
One positive development is  that  the  end of the cold  war has  made  it  possible to  cut 
defence  budgets.  I Iowcver,  in  the  long run  the  need  lor the  dclcncc-related  industries 
substantially to  scale down their activities,  though  the  efforts  lor reconversion toward 
civil  activities,  had  directs  effects  on  unemployment  losses  especially  in  some 
rcgions.And if the  required adjustments for  the  restructuring arc not put in place, other 
consequences could manifest themselves in  the long run in  the form of impowcrishmcnt 
of the production base and the innovation capability ofthe european industry. 
Maintenance and  reinforcement of the  sufficiently autonomous,  competitive  industrial 
and  technology  base which  Europe  needs  in  order to  implement  its  common  defence 
policy inevitably entails integration of the defence-related industries. This rationalization 
will allow more efficient cooperation  for both the development and the production of 
military  hardware.  European  undertakings  will  become  all  the  more  efficient  and 
II compdi  I i  w  i r they develop synl!rgil!s,  coop~.!  rat ion  and even restructuring on the single 
market. 
The EU  must foster the development of its own base f()r  the tcdmologies and products 
essential for defence in  Europe. Consequently, it  must endeavour to  secure comparable, 
effective  access  to  markets  in  third  countries,  which  would  reduce  the  one-way 
dependence on the third countries. 
Completion  of a  European  market  in  defence-related  products  should  improve  the 
efficiency of this sector and, consequently, cut costs for  purchasers.  Defence authorities' 
budgets will  therefore  benefit.  I Iowcvcr,  they must ensure that  the market offers them 
products in  I  inc with the duties assigned to their armed forces. 
Increasingly, Europe will have to develop its operational capacity to prevent and manage 
conflicts. As provided for in the WEU's June I 992 Pctershcrg Declaration, in addition to 
its contribution to common defence in accordance with the NATO and WEU Treaties the 
WEU's tasks consist of keeping and restoring the  peace, evacuations and humanitarian 
aid operations. These call on the European and national organizations concerned to plan 
and develop the appropriate equipment. 
The long process of building a European security and de!Cncc identity has already begun. 
The Treaty on European Union and its annexed Declaration on Western European Union 
provide  a  means  of taking  account,  at  European  level,  of the  political  and  security 
constraints which must shape all action on the defence-related industries. To this end, one 
important point to  note is that the crsr already provides a  framework and instruments 
whieh could eontribute to defining the eontcxt and priorities for such action. Thl: WEU is 
developing  its  own  resources  with  the  objective of giving  Europe's  defence  cfkctivc 
operational capacity. It is therefore essential to ensure a degree of  parallelism between the 
EU's and the WEU's work. 
2.2.2  The Intergovernmental Conference 
The Intergovernmental Conference starting at the end of March  199(, will  discuss, inter 
alia,  developments  concerning  common  security  and  defence  policies,  including  the 
armaments aspects. Certainly, this does not necessarily mean waiting to  implement the 
conclusions of the IGC  before taking European action on  the defence industry.  On the 
contrary,  it  will  be easier for  the  IGC  to  take  decisions  if the  parties  involved  in  the 
industry arc cooperating already and the public authorities have already taken specific 
action  for  this sector at  European level.  In  particular,  it  will  be easier for  the IGC to 
provide  the  means  for  a  European  armaments  policy  if an  efficient  industry  meeting 
Europe's security needs has  been  maintained in  the meantime.  The  Wcstendorp report 
which has  received strong support among Member States,  asserts that  the  Conference 
should consider how to encourage the development of European operational capabilities, 
how to promote closer European cooperation in the field of  armaments and how to ensure 
greater  coherence  of  action  in  the  military  field  with  the  political,  economic  or 
humanitarian aspects of European crisis management. 
12 3. The players and means of action 
3.1  The  European  Union:  promotion  of the  syner~ics  between  its  v:trious 
means of action 
On  the  armaments  market,  supply  and  demand  follow  special  rules  dictated  by  the 
exclusive role of the public authorities, which arc guided largely by  security and  foreign 
policy imperatives. This implies that armament issues could he discussed within the ElJ's 
CFSP bodies.  I lowever,  the  economic dimension of armament issues  inevitably entails 
interaction  with  the  EC  Treaty.  In  this  context,  either  the  rules  already  in  f(Jrce, 
particularly on the single European market, must be taken as the basis fi1r  drafting rules 
specifically for  the  armaments sector or the existing rules  must be applied, taking full 
account, however, of  the specific nature of  the sector. Completion of  such a single market 
for  armaments  will  create,  in  the  perspective  of the  eventual  framing  of a  common 
defence  policy,  interdependence  between  Member  States  for  supplies  of  defence 
eqttipment.  This will  facilitate  security of supply of such equipment between Member 
States under market conditions. 
Although a European market in defence-related products could be established by applying 
the relevant rules of the EC Treaty and of Title V of the Treaty on  European  Union, it 
must also be acknowledged that a single European market implies that it must have its 
own identity vis-it-vis third countries. This would be created by establishing specific rules 
concerning  the  customs  union,  commercial  policy  and  access  to  public  contracts.  In 
particular, it must be stressed that with this defence-products market with its own identity 
the European Union would be in a better position to  secure comparable, dTective access 
for its products to markets in third countries under mutually advantage conditions. In this 
connection,  once  normal  conditions  have  been  restored  within  the  Customs  Union, 
transatlantic  trade must  be developed  on  the  basis of reciprocal  liberalization with the 
objective of strengthening transatlantic cooperntion on armaments, including on export 
limits on "inhuman" weapons (antipersonnel  mines).  Establishh1ent of such a  balanced 
relationship also implies establishing mechanisms for evaluating the volume of trade and 
enforcing effective and comparable access to markets in practice, where necessary. 
3.1.1  Instruments available within the EC framcworl\: 
f-irst,  the Community authorities have a  range of instruments concerning the  industrial 
aspects  of armaments.  Second  and  above  all,  the  Community  framework  offers  the 
possibility of applying binding rules taking account of the specific nature of the sector 
and  guaranteeing  legal  certainty  for  all  involved  and  fair  conditions  throughout  the 
Community market. 
In view of the importance of these instruments, this communication places the accent on 
the means of action available to the European Community which can be implemented in 
the short term.  For this reason, a  more detailed analysis of this potential is  set out in 
Chapter 4, taking account of  the specific nature of  the sector. 
13 These considerations will undoubtedly be an extremely important factor in  ensuring that, 
in  contrast  to  past  practice,  the  Member  States  no  longer  interpret  the  exemptions 
authorized by Article 223 of the EC Treaty so broadly.  In  particular, hitherto Article 223 
of the EC Treaty has placed limits on the Community framework by allowing exemptions 
from the provisions of the Treaty for  "the production of or trade in arms, munitions and 
war  material".  This  exemption  applies  only  under  particular  circumstances  and 
conditions since the same article adds that the national measures on the subject must he 
"necessary  for  the  protection of the  essential  interests of the  security"  of the  Member 
State and must "not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market 
regarding  products  which  arc  not  intended  fix  specifically  military  purposes." 
Article 225  lays down, in  particular, procedures for the Court of Justice to  monitor the 
national measures taken under Article 223.  Moreover, Article 223 states that the national 
exemptions may apply solely to the prodm.:ts on the list to  he established by  the Council 
in  195X.  This  list  was adopted  by  the  Council on  15  April  I  958 and  has  never  been 
changed since.  Consequently, Article 223 gives the Member States no exclusive general 
powers.  Instead, it gives them the possibility of invoking an exemption to the discipline 
imposed by the Treaty under the conditions described above and under the supervision of 
the Courts. 
Hitherto,  however,  some  Member  States  have  interpreted  this  Article  broadly  and 
divergently, accentuating the fragmentation of  the European defence market.  Exemptions 
have been applied to a wider range of products without reference to the 1958 list.  The 
Commission has never exercised  its  powers to  take the  initiative  to  amend  the  list of 
products.  Moreover, many Member States have seen Article 223 as embodying a general 
principle that all areas concerning national security arc not covered by the Treaties.  The 
Commission has  always  contested  this  approach,  an  attitude confirmed by two  recent 
Court of Justice judgments.  In  cases C-70/94 and C-83/94 the Court gave its ruling on 
the Community's exclusive powers under Article II 3 of the Treaty and dual-usc goods. 
In  particular, it  found  that since full  responsibility for commercial policy was transferred 
to the Community, national commercial policy measures arc therefore permissible only if 
they arc specifically authorized by the Community and that a product cannot fall  outside 
the scope ofthc common commercial policy on the grounds that it is of  a strategic nature. 
On this basis, Article II of Regulation (EEC) No 2603/69 establishing common rules for 
exports allows Member States to adopt national restrictive measures to avoid the "risk of 
a serious disturbance to foreign relations or to peaceful coexistence of nations which may 
affect  the  security of a  Member State".  Moreover  "a  measure  ...  whose  effect  is  to 
prevent or restrict the export of certain products cannot be treated as falling outside the 
scope of the common commercial policy on the grounds that it  has foreign  policy and 
security objectives." 
3.1.2  Instruments available under the common foreign and security policy 
The Treaty on European Union created a new situation by introducing a common fincign 
and security policy (CFSP) which "shall include all questions related to  the sccurity of the 
Union, including the eventual drafting of  a common defence policy, which might in time 
lead to a common defence". 
14 Security is a general concept.  It therefore also includes issues relating to armaments.  At 
the same time the Maastricht Treaty introtlm:etl the concept or important interests which 
the Member States have in common.  In  particular, the Union is gradually implementing 
joint action in areas where the Member States have important interests in common.  In the 
case of security, these important common interests were idcnti lied in  preparation for the 
entry  into  l"orec  of the Treaty on  European  llnion (sec the conclusions adopted  by  the 
European Council in  Copenhagen on the  preparatory work  on security).  This notion or 
common security interests will  make it  easier to  decide the conditions f(x  implementing 
the action necessary in the armaments sector within the framework of" the CFSP. 
In  the  "Declaration on  non-proliferation  and  arms  exports"  adopted  hy  the  European 
Council  in  .June  1991  and  supplemented  in  .June  1992,  the  !leads  of  State  and 
Government expressed the desire f(lr a common approach leading to a  harmonization of 
national  policies  on  arms  exports,  based  on  the  eight  criteria  agreed  on  arms  export 
policies. 
At the Maastricht European Council they identified areas where common action could be 
taken  as  part  of"  the  future  common  f(lrcign  and  security  policy.  These  include  the 
economic aspects of  security, in particular control of  the transfer of military technology to 
third countries and control of  arms exports. 
In  1995 the ElJ took joint action, based on Article .1.3  of the Treaty on European Union, 
inter alia on extension or the Non-proliferation Treaty and on anti-personnel mines. The 
latter,  in  particular,  included  a  han  on  exports of mines  from  the  Union,  based  on 
humanitarian as well as ftlrcign and security policy concerns. 
I 
The  existing  legislation  together  with  the  ol~jectivcs  of the  CFSP  therefore  lay  the 
foundation for the EU  to evolve a policy and action  n~aking the most appropriate usc of 
the  instruments available under the Community framework and  under the  CFSP to the 
benefit of  the defence-related industries. 
The European Union has a single institutional  framework which ensures the consistency 
and  continuity  of the  activities  carried  out  in  order  to  attain  its  objectives  while 
complying with and building on the existing Community legislation.  In particular, the 
Union ensures the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its 
external relations,  security, economic and development policies.  The Council and  the 
Commission arc responsible for ensuring this consistency.  They ensure implementation 
of these policies, each acting in accordance with its respective powers (Article  C of the 
Treaty on  European  Union).  In  an economic area without internal  frontiers  and with 
common security interests,  consistency demands that the  Union  institutions implement 
policies ensuring greater combination of  the powers of  the institutions in connection with 
the various pillars ofthe Union. 
15 3.2.  Closer cooperation between the WEU ami EU 
3.2.1  Relations hetween the EU  ~tnd WEU 
In  the  Declaration on  Western European Union, as annexed to  the Treaty on  European 
Union,  the  WEU  Member States agreed  oi1  the  need  to  develop  a  genuine  European 
security ami defence identity and a  greater European  responsibility on defence matters. 
The WEll would be developed as the uclencc component of the European Union and as a 
means to strengthen the I  ~utopcan pillar or the Atlantic Alliance. 
At their meeting in Bonn in  December 1992 the Ministers of Defence of  the 13  countries 
then in the lnucpendcnt European Programme Group (IEPG) set up in  1976 decided to 
transfer  the  Group's  functions  to  the  WEU,  in  accordance  with  the  objectives  set  in 
Maastricht. 
The  Western  European  Armaments  Group  (WEAG),  formerly  the  IEPG,  bringing 
together 13  countries, including 2 non-EU members, was thus set up and attached to the 
WEU as the body responsible for cooperation on armaments issues within the WEU.  The 
objectives of the WEAG arc to open up the national defence markets to competition, to 
rcinli.)rcc  Europe's technological and industrial  base in  the defence sector and  to  bring 
about closer cooperation  on  research  and  development.  At  the  meeting of the  WEl J 
Council in  Noordwijk on  14 November 1994, the Ministers of Defence from the WEAG 
countries noted the establishment of  an armaments secretariat within the WElJ. 
As  its  operational  role develops  the  WEU/WEAG  will  probably  take  on activities  in 
fields where the EU  is active on the basis of the Community policies.  Given that the EU 
and the WEU/WEAG have common political objectives, where their activities cover the 
same fields there arc clear advantages to  be gained from mutual information and closer 
cooperation, particularly in terms of  cfticicncy, costs and consistency. 
Closer cooperation between the EU  institutions and the  WEAG would be  facilitated  by 
building bridges between the European institutions dealing with defence markets.  Such 
synergies and bridges could be established rapidly and pragmatically on the basis of the 
Treaty of Rome or of Title V  (li.)r  example, by extending the existing information and 
consultation procedures between the WEU and the Commission). 
3.2.2  European Armaments Agency 
The Declaration on Western European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union 
provided for enhanced cooperation between the Member States concerned in the field of 
armaments  with  the  aim  of creating  a  European  Armaments  Agency.  Despite  the 
considerable  progress  made  with  defining  the  Agency's  tasks  and  statutes,  the 
groundwork has revealed that big differences still remain on the principles and priorities 
of the Agency's activities. 
16 The WEAG's decision establishing the Agency has theref(Jre been delayed.  Against this 
background, the Commission should consider its possible contribution to establishing this 
Agency and to defining its tasks and carrying out its activities. 
In  addition, Prance and Germany have decided to  set up  a joint armaments structure in 
1996 to allow more rational cooperation and contribute towards establishing an efficient 
and  appropriate industrial and  technological  base. The Ministers of these two countries 
declared that this move is  part or the process of  c..:stablishing  tlw common security policy 
provided for in the Maastricht Treaty and, in particular, marks a constructive step towards 
establishment ofthe European Armaments Agency. 
The  Maastricht  Treaty  stipulates  that  the  WEll  "as  the  dcl'ence  component  of the 
European  Union  will  li>rmulate common European defence policy and carry f(>rward  its 
concrete  implementation through  the  further development of its  own operational  role." 
To  this end,  for  intcroperability  and  cost  reasons  and  in  order to  fulfil  the  common 
security  objectives/tasks,  increasingly  the  equipment  requirements  of  the  forces 
participating  in  the  WEU  will  in  turn  become common.  Definition  by  the  WEll of 
European  forces'  operational  requirements  will  mark  a  decisive  step  lor  European 
armaments policy.  In  particular,  largely common demand  for  armaments  from  WEU 
states would put the  EU  in  a  position  to  define  more  closely  the  rules governing the 
internal  market,  imports  and  supplies  of military  equipment.  Here  too  cooperation 
between the EU and the WEU is essential. 
4. Contribution  of the Community instruments and  activities  of relevance  to  the 
dcfcncc-rclatcd industry 
4.1.  Internal m:tdwt :tnd tcchnologic:tl base 
4.1. 1  Public procurement 
The Commission is convinced that important benefits could be derived by the defence 
community from  applying procurement procedures largely inspired by those applied in 
the EU's civil sector. 
It recognizes that the specific character of the defence sector, which involves essential 
national  security interests,  which may vary among Member States,  may require  some 
adjustments  to  the  procedures  which  arc  enshrined  in  the  Community's  procurement 
directives.  However, it is  important that the main features of those rules are applied as 
uniformally as possible. 
Indeed, the procurement regime, which exists in the Community is  based mainly on the 
following  principles:  a  generally  applicable  non-discrimination  and  equal  treatment 
principle,  competitive tendering,  open  and  transparent  procedures  based  on  o~jectivc 
selection and award criteria and an enforcement structure consisting of legal remedies for 
aggrieved  suppliers and an  independent enforcement authority which  has  investigative 
powers and can seck corrective measures. 
17 According  to  a  study carried  out  in  1992  for  the  Commission  into  the  "Cost of non-
Europe in Defence Procurement '"',defence procurement amounted, in  1990 in  the EU  to 
about 65  to  70  billion  ECU a  year.  Enicicnt purchasing  in  this  sector could  result  in 
savings  of between  5  to  II  billion  EClJ  per  year  thereby  avoiding  the  substantial 
duplication of industrial capabilities in aircrall, helicopters, missiles, tanks and warships 
in the sector. 
These principles have been further developed by the Council in  six directives which lay 
down detailed provisions on procurement of goods, services and public works by public 
authorities and utilities and minimum requirements as to legal remedies.  These detailed 
rules only apply above certain monetary thresholds.  It  is  important to  keep  in  mind, 
however, that the  abovementioned principles apply to  all  contracts, regardless of their 
value.  Applying a similar legal environment to the defence sector would enable Member 
States  to  take  full  advantage  of the  savings  delivered  by  eflicient  procurement  pro-
cedures,  while  being  reassured  that  their  partners  abide  by  the  same  rules  and  arc 
submitted to the same discipline. 
Although  the  main  core of the  Community's  procurement  regime  should  therel(lrc  be 
applied to the defence sector as well, certain adjustments need to be made in order to take 
into account the specificity of that sector.  The main issues in  this regard are the need to 
ensure  the  confidentiality  of  information  "the  disclosure  of which  Member  States 
consider  contrary  to  their  essential  security  interests",  and  the  need  to  maintain 
guaranteed sources of  supply. 
The Community's procurement directives provide for three different types of purchasing 
procedures,  i.e.  open,  restricted  or  negotiated.  Although  utilities  can  freely  choose 
between  these  three  alternatives,  public  authorities  should  normally  opt  for  open 
procedures,  unless  there  arc  important justifications  to  usc  one  of the  others.  The 
Commission could well imagine that for certain strictly limited defence purchases, public 
authorities will consider bids only from companies which have been selected beforehand 
on the  hasis of ohjective criteria as  willing and  able to  maintain  the  confidentiality of 
sensitive inli.mnation.  It is  important to ensure, of course, that  this selection process is 
not used as a disguised means ofarhitrarily eliminating certain suppliers. 
With regard to the necessity to maintain guaranteed sources of  supply, especially in  times 
of international  tension  or  war,  the  Commission  feels  that  the  current  regime  offers 
sufficient possibilities to take this clement into account. First of all  the purchasing entity 
could select suppliers on the  basis of their ability to  ensure supply  under virtually all 
circumstances.  Furthermore  they  could  conclude  nmltilatcral  contracts,  i.e.  contracts 
concluded  with  several  suppliers  for  one type of product or service.  In  such a  case a 
hierarchical order would be  established between the various suppliers.  If supplier one is 
not  able  to  provide  the  product  within  a  given  time-period  the  product  would  be 
purchased from the next company in line and so on.  · 
r.  In  1990 de-fence procuremeftt arP!Olmled  in the EU to about 65 to 70 billion ECU per year within which 
expenditure on Artic.:le  223 items was estimated at ECU 40 billion. 
18 If a Mt:mh<.:r Stale feels that its needs can he fully md hy a ofTcr from a non-Ell company 
which makes the bt:st ofli.:r  f(>r  that Member State's money thcr<.:  docs not seem to  be a 
compelling reason  J(>r  the  Community to  require  this  Member State to  select an offer 
which satisfies its needs less well for the sole reason that it is  presented by a Community 
supplier. This does not mean, of course, that the third-country supplier will  be able to 
claim  any  rights  to  even  being  considered  as  a  possible  supplier.  At  this  stage,  the 
Commission considt:rs that it  would be  prcli.:rablc only to  apply these rights,  including 
legal remedies, to Community suppliers. 
The Commission intends further to explore these ideas, as well as others which may he 
presented,  with  the  other  institutions  and  with  representatives  of the  Member States, 
taking into due account the objective of  enhancing  in a dynamic way the competitiveness 
of the  European  dclcncc-rclated  industry.  If this  leads  to  legislative  measures,  it  is 
obvious that these will have to be binding on all  Member States. 
I lowevcr, in  order to  allow Member States some flexibility  in  extreme cases involving 
national security, a safeguard clause should be  included in  those measures.  This clause 
could be used on condition that other Member States and the Commission arc informed 
immediately  alter  the  decision  to  procure  without  following  the  common  rules. 
Sufficiently detailed reasons should be given. 
4.1.2  Intra-Community trade 
The  internal  market  docs  not  only  constitute  a  trade  area  favouring  greater 
competitiveness,  but  also  provides  the  environment  for  stronger cooperation  amongst 
European  industries.  By  facilitating  intra-Community  trade,  the  completion  of  a 
"European  defence  market"  should  facilitate  both  cooperation  and  integration  in  the 
European defence-related industry. 
Regarding the  EU  framework, the gradual opening of intra-European borders requires a 
minimum standard of competition policy and in  the long term harmonized export rules. 
Furthermore,  it  implies  especially,  whenever  possible,  the  simplification  and 
rationalization of controls on intra-Community trade carried out by States. In view of this 
objective and in  order to  coordinate the methods of control and ensure more transparent 
results, certain Community instruments should be put in  place, based on administrative 
cooperation. 
· The  need  to  simplify  the  national  control  procedures  concerning  the  movement  of 
defence products applies even more when the trade concerned by these controls takes 
place within the framework of industrial cooperation agreements.  However, the principle 
of mutual recognition recognized in the framework of the EC Treaty could be used as a 
basis for  technical specifications used for  the construction of defence-related products, 
either in an intergovernmental framework, or through a Commission initiative. 
19 At  the  end  of the  day,  trade  within  Europe  will  not  only  contribute  to  eliminating 
distortions of  competition, hut also facilitate industrial cooperation and integration, whilst 
still assuring the necessary provisions for the national security of Member States. 
4.1.3  Research anc.l  technological c.lcvcl6pmcnt (RTI>) activities 
Although they arc  f(>cuscd  on  civil  objectives,  Community research  programmes,  like 
civil  research  activities  at  national  level,  arc  increasingly  of interest  lor  the  defence 
technology base because of (I) the overlapping and converging technology needs of the 
civil  and  defence sectors  in  a  wide range of areas (dual-usc technologies) and  (2)  the 
leading role taken  hy  the civilian  markets in  the development of a  growing number of 
these dual-usc technologies. 
As the competitiveness of the Community industry is a primary objective of Community 
RTD  policy,  Community  programmes  support  research  in  a  wide  range  of dual-usc 
technological  areas  ·(production  technologies,  advanced  materials,  information 
technologies, communications technologies, telcmatics, aeronautics, energy storage and 
conversion, etc.). 
It has been estimated that technological areas of  potential dual-use interest account for as 
much as one third (i.e. about I billion ECU per year) of the overall Community research 
budget.  It  is  therefore  not  surprising  that  a  number  of companies  and  research 
organizations  known  to  he  active  in  the  defence  sector  participate  in  Community 
programmes and that some Member States arc encouraging them to do so.  Some of these 
companies arc also being consulted in the framework of the Commission's Task Forces to 
improve the links between research and industry (e.g. aeronautics). 
Community  RTD  programmes  can  contribute  to  the  technology  hasc  of the  defence-
related  industry  in  several  ways  : (I)  by  strengthening  the  overall  European  research 
infrastructure and scientific base; (2)  by  supporting R&D projects leading, after further 
development,  to  commercial  products,  processes,  standards  or  improved  quality 
assurance which can also be used in  the defence sector; (3) by supporting R&D projects 
on  generic  technologies  which  can  lead,  after  further  development,  to  either  civil  or 
defence-specific  applications.  Furthermore,  Community  programmes  can  also  support 
research by defence related organizations to  develop civil applications of their defence 
technologies. 
With  the  growing  importance  of trans-European  R&D  cooperation  in  both  civil  and 
defence sectors, it is now appropriate to consider how, and to what extent increased civil-
defence synergies can be promoted at the European level with the aim of optimizing the 
overall usc of R&D efforts. 
The Commission considers that,  while maintaining the civil orientation of Community 
research programmes, appropriate steps to start addressing these issues should be : 
- to establish cooperntion links between EC and WEAG research progr01mmcs  to avoid 
duplications,  to  ensure  comp1ementarity,  and  to  fa<:ilitatc  optimal  use  of research 
results; 
20 - to  identify,  in  cooperation with  the  WE/\(i and  industry,  key dual-usc technological 
. areas where European capabilities arc weak or not sufficiently autonomous and should 
be strengthened; 
- to  determine, on the  basis of the  experience and  knowledge from  the above action, 
whether, how and to what extent dual-usc considerations should be taken into account 
in  the  preparation  of  the  future  Community  programmes  (Filth  Framework 
Programme). 
4. 1.4  Shmdardization ~md  technic~•  I harmonization 
Standardization has been transformed in  recent years from a marginal policy area to one 
which  is  attracting priority attention  within  European  industry as a  means of reducing 
costs  and  promoting  industrial  competitiveness.  It  is  recognized  to  he  of strategic 
importance for the efficiency of  the internal market. 
Union-wide standardization policies are relevant to  the defence-related industry in such 
key  areas  as  information  technology,  telecommunications,  power  supply;  laser 
technology, new materials, aerospace and quality systems and conformity assessment. In 
many of these areas, civil standardization activity is proceeding faster than similar work 
organized for  purely military purposes and  civil  standards arc  becoming  more  widely 
used in defence procurement. 
Hence,  further  convergence  of civil  and  military  usc  of standardization,  in  order  to 
maximize economic  benefits  and  to  minimize  duplication  of effort  and  the  waste  of 
scarce technical expertise, should he one of  the main objectives of Ell policy in  respect of 
the defence-related im)ustry. 
Greater  usc  by the  military of the  existing  standardization  mechanisms and company 
accreditation at international and European level  will combine the advantages of lower 
costs of  procurement, greater competition in supply and, in some cases, shorter lead-times 
in the development of  standards. 
Although the scope for the usc of civil standardization will remain limited or even non-
existent in some security-sensitive areas, such as weaponry, in other areas standardization 
can provide a common basis frorri which additional, non-standard, requirements may be 
developed by the military, if necessary. Unnecessary overlap between civil and military 
standardization work should be avoided for reasons of  industrial efficiency and budgetary 
savmgs. 
In  order to  promote civil/military convergence in  this field,  the Commission considers 
that the following steps would be helpful: 
21 •  the  conclusion  of cooperative  arrangements  between  the  European  standardization 
organizations and  NATO standardization experts in  order to  identify areas of 
common interest of  overlap in their current activity, perhaps by means or  a joint 
report; 
•  identification by the defence authorities within the EU of standardization work already 
planned in  the civil  field that could also he of interest to the military, with the 
possibility  of  Community  support,  where  appropriate,  by  standardization 
mandates; 
•  the establishment of a system  for regular information exchange between NATO with 
the European standardization bodies in order to minimize the risk of  duplication 
of work in the future. 
Examples of such initiatives which have already been launched include developments in 
the  field of CALS (Continuous Acquisition and Life cycle Support) where cooperation 
between civil and military structures is about to be implemented. 
Recent  discussions  between  the  European  Commission  and  the  European  aeronautics 
industry have taken place to  bring about closer integration between military and civil 
standards. 
NATO has also shown interest by setting up a new standardization organization (NSO). 
These  initiatives  would  not  affect  the  continued  commitment  of the  Community to 
ensure  that  European  standardization  is  based  on  international  standards  wherever 
possible. 
4.1.5  Competition policy 
In  the  light of the emergence of a Community market fix the defence industry, resulting 
from  common  defence  programmes,  from  European  alliances  and  from  necessary 
restructuring,  there is  a  place  for  the Community competition policy.  It  can  facilitate, 
thanks  to  a  clear framework  and quick decisions,  the  concentrations and cooperations 
between  companies  which  do  not  call  into  question  effective  competition.  Moreover, 
rigorous control of State aids will make it possible to  distinguish between aid necessary 
for  restructuring,  since  it  accelerates  change,  encourages  research,  development  and 
innovation  and  reduces  the  social  consequences  of reorganization,  and  aid  used  for 
defensive  reasons  that  certain  Member  States  might  be  inclined  to  usc  to  avoid  the 
necessary  structural  changes  and  transfer  the  production  and  employment  adjustment 
costs onto other Member States.  The control of aid should also provide a means to make 
sure,  in  a  more  effective  manner  than  today,  that  aid  granted  to  the  defence-related 
industry is not also used by certain companies to subsidize civil production. 
In a sector such as the defence-related industry, the introduction of  effective competition 
should therefore result in considerable productivity gains, in the form of cost reductions 
and increased innovation which could only improve the industry's exporting capacity. 
22 The Commission considers that the legal  basis f(lr  the  Community's competition policy 
could be used and provide an adequate framework for competition matters relating to the 
European defence-related industry. 
However, the application of competition law to  the  defence-related industry must take 
into consideration the speci lie features of this industry. It must also he consistent with the 
objectives or other Community policies, he receptive to  inl(lrmation and comments from 
Member States' Ministries or Defence (MODs)  in  their capacity as  main clients or the 
defence-related industry and allow Member States to  take appropriate measures in order 
to  protect national security in  addition to  those  measures which  might be  taken  by  the 
Commission to  maintain and develop eiTcdive competition.  Competition policy in  the 
defence-related  industry  should  be  implemented  progressively,  in  lields  such  as Stale 
aids, agreements and concerted practices since, up  to  the  present date, the Commission 
has adopted a careful approach to exercising its competence in  these fields.  Finally, it  is 
evident  that  the  Commission  will  take  into  consideration,  in  the  operation  of  its 
competition policy  for  the  defence-related  industry,  the  manner in  which  in  particular 
governments  of  third  countries  which  produce  armaments  formulate  and  apply 
competition law to their own industry. 
So  far  the  Commission  has  approved/notified  concentrations  (sec  table  m  Annex) of 
defence industries on the following lines: 
- For the moment, geographic markets for defence products and services tend to  remain 
national  where  a  domestic  supplier exists  because  MODs  still  tend  to  have  strong 
preferences f(Jr  national suppliers.  However, where there is no domestic supplier, then 
subject to  other barriers such as export restrictions and national  preferences, suppliers 
of deknce products and services compete with each other world-wide.  Consequently, 
dominant  positions  hy  European  defence-related  companies  at  world  level  arc  not 
likely to be observed, given the weight of lJS competitors in this area.  Likewise, when 
the  geographic  market  is  national,  a  dominant  position,  if any,  is  normally  not 
strengthened, given that there is  no addition of market share, except when the merger 
concerns two national suppliers. 
- When assessing the market position of  a firm  in the defence industry, account must be 
taken of the bargaining power of its main clients: the Ministries of Defence (MODs) of 
the  States  concerned.  MODs  generally  formulate  the  operational  requirements  and 
technical  specifications of armaments.  Also,  as  a  consequence  of the  reduction  in 
national defence budgets, MODs tend to  require  higher technical specifications with 
lower levels of manpower and lower overall costs and to  be reluctant to bear the .risks 
associated with R&D. 
- The Commission considered the general views of the MODs concerned as relevant for 
the assessment of  the operation. 
The extent to  which a  common market for  defence equipment is  achieved is  crucial  to 
evaluate the effects of the  merger policy on  the  conditions of competition.  As  l~tr as 
national markets remain, further concentration may aggravate monopolistic inefficiencies 
23 that can extend into civilian areas of business. On the other hand, if progress towards a 
common  market  filr  defence  equipment  is  nchicwd.  nnd  provi<kd  th:tl  conditions  or 
competition arc preserved, business consolidation may contribute litvourahly tu  t·:utup~itll 
competitiveness on a global market. 
Finally the  Merger  Regulation  allows  Member States to  take  appropriate  measures to 
protect  public security 
7.This  clause  which  reaffirms  Member  States'  ability  either  to 
prohibit a concentration or to make it  subject to additional conditions and requirements 
compatible with Community law, has been used once by a Member State X. 
As regards agreements and State aids, the Commission has always approved the notified 
operations. The Commission is  conscious that cooperation programmes arc necessary in 
the  defence-related  industry,  in  view  of the  size  of certain  projects  which  require 
substantial financing and multiple skills. As far as financing of military R&D by Member 
States is required, the Commission takes account of the particularities of defence-related 
activities,  namely  a  high  technology  base  of production,  high  costs  and  a  very long 
development cycle, which, to a large degree, require public financing. Concerning aid for 
rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty, great attention should be given in particular 
to social and regional policy considerations. 
4.1.6  Structural Funds 
A  study carried out in  1992  lilr the Commission on the economic and social  impact of' 
reductions  in  dcfem:c  spending and  military  lilrccs  on  the  regions  of the  Community 
showed that about half of the regions in  which defence-related activity is concentrated arc 
not  eligible lilr assistance under the Structural Funds instruments (Objective I, 2 or 5(b) 
regions). Following the revision of the Structural Fund Regulations in  1993, a number of 
these areas (in UK, France and Italy) were integrated into Objective 2 regions. As a result 
more than  half the defence-dependent areas arc  now in  assisted  areas.  It is,  however, 
important to  note  that even  in  assisted  areas,  Structural  Fund aid  is  not  available  for 
investment  in  the  defence-related  industry  itself.  The  role  of the  Structural  f.'unds  is 
therefore  limited  to  providing general  economic development assistance (including aid 
for  conversion)  through  the  Community Support  Frameworks  in  place  in  the  assisted 
regions and to the KONVER initiative. 
In  this context,  Objective 4  of the  European  Social  Fund  and  the  related  Community 
Initiative ADAPT have established a horizontal approach (i.e without a priori reference to 
specific  industries  or  sectors)  to  structural  change  and  its  effects  on  the 
workforce.Incertain circumstances, assistance  is  available  for  measures which help the 
adaptation of  workers threatened with unployment due to industrial change and change in 
production  systems  (especially  within  small  and  medium  size  cnterprises).Particular 
emphasis  is  placed  on  the  anticipation  of  labour  market  trends  and  improving 
qualifications and employment opportunities for the workers in question. 
Cf. Art. 21(3) of the Regulation 
M  Sec point 321  of the XXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy 
24 In  response  to  calls  from  the  European  Parliament,  the Commission adopted  Pcrifra  I 
( 1991) and Pcrifra II (1992). These special measures included support for demonstration 
projects  which  could  serve  as  models  for  the  conversion  of military  installations.  In 
conformity  with  the  position  taken  by  the  Parliament,  the  KONVER  Community 
Initiative was adopted in 1993 to assist regions weakened by the decline of  defence indus-
tries and installations. The annual programme introduced in  1993 has been extended on a 
~nultiannual hasis up to the end of 1997. 
The  purpose of KONVIm  is  to  provide support  f(lr  economic diversification  in  areas 
heavily  dependent  on  defence-related  activities  through  the  encouragement  of 
commercially viable activities not related to defence. 
Eligihlc areas can he  located anywhere in  the  l·:ll, although at least S0%1  of the  1994-97 
KONVER budget must  be spent in  ERDF assisted areas (Objective  I, 2  or 5(b)).  The 
eligible  areas  arc  small  geographical  regions  in  which  actual  or  announced  dclencc-
related job  losses  total  I .000  or more  since  I 990.  Other areas  heavily  dependent  on 
defence  can  also  he  accepted  as  eligible  regions  taking  into  account  their  high 
unemployment rates, poor environmental conditions, or isolation/remote location. 
A  full  range  of conversion  measures  including  the  financing  of both  tangible  and 
intangible  investment  in  alternative  economic  activities,  the  modernization  of 
infrastructure in relation to the economic regeneration strategy of the area concerned, and 
measures in  favour of the environment and tourism can be financed through KONVER. 
The budget for the programme is ECU I 30 million for  1993 and ECU 500 million for the 
period  I 994-97.  A  reserve  of ECU  245  million  to  support  product  innovation,  the 
development of environmental  technologies and  SMEs was allocated  to  the  KONVER 
initiative on 4 October I 995. KONVER was also extended until  the end of 1999. Loans 
from the European Investment Bank arc also available. 
Also, the possibility and detailed ruled  f(>r  financing  from  other ElJ  resources could be 
examined in the light of the priorities of the armament policy. 
4.2.  The external dimension 
4.2.1  Export policy 
In  the  European  Union,  national  policies  on  arms  exports  have  traditionally  differed 
considerably,  ranging  fi·om  nearly  total  ban  to  a  voluntaristic  approach,  where  arms 
export is considered vital not only for strategic and political reasons but also for reducing 
unit  costs  and  maintaining  a  broad  defence  industrial  and  technological  base  at  the 
national  level.  Not  less  importantly,  assessments  of the  risk  of exports  to  certain 
destinations, linked to  foreign  policy considerations, have traditionally been made on a 
national basis.  The ensuing differences between Member States are not without cost : 
national concerns about either a  too  restrictive or too  liberal  approach of one or more 
other Member States on arms exports in  general, or in  regard to specific destinations, 
have not favoured  intra-European industrial cooperation or integration.  Differences in 
export  policy  thus  also  impede  the  development  of intra-European  policies.  As  a 
consequence the development of common policies inside the European Union in order to 
secure the industrial basis of  the sector should be complemented by a corresponding level 
or harmonization or national export policies and export-control systems. 
25 The  European  Council  has  taken  a  first  step  towards  a  common  approach  on  arms 
exports, by adopting, in June 1991  (Luxembourg) and June 1992 (Lisbon) (in the annex), 
eight criteria which  Member States  interpret when deciding on  issuing a  licence  for  a 
specific export.  Exchanges of information on the concrete application of the criteria arc 
being conducted between Member States, with a view to harmonizing their interpretation. 
Given  the  difricullics  in  dcvclopping a  common basis  for  the  harmonization of arms 
export policies a gradual prm:css should be pursued following a two steps approach. In 
a first stage,  regular exchange of information between Member States on arms exports 
(type and quantity of exported material, destination, end-usc) should be pursued. In the 
case  of cooperation  programmes,  which  should  be  encouraged,  progress  could  be 
achieved  on  the  basis  of current  experiences,  namely  by  following  the  principles 
according to  which export rules  of the country where the prime contractor is  located 
apply. 
In a second stage the establishment should be pursued of an operational system aimed 
at eliminating the distorsions between the  various national treatments. The drafting of 
such  a  system  should,  for  it  to  become  effective,  take  into  account  the  modalities, 
principles,  scope  and  the  possible  needs  for  improvement,  based  on  the  experience 
gained  with  the  establishment  of the  export  control  regime  on  dual-use  goods  and 
technologies (see below). 
4.2.2  Export controls on dual-usc goods and technologies 
To  res(>lve  one of the  most di rticult problems hindering the  completion of the  internal 
market,  i.e.  the  problem  of controls on  intra-Community trade  in  dual-usc goods,  the 
Council agreed, after two years of intensive discussions on a  Commission proposal, to 
establish a Community export control systt:m. It is based on two legal instruments, viz. an 
J\rticlc  113  Regulation<)  and  a  Joint  Action  under  the  Common  Foreign  and  Security 
Policy! 0, which together form an integrated system. Both texts were formally adopted hy 
the Council on 19 December 1994 and apply from  I July 1995. 
The  objective of the  integrated  system  is  to  ensure  that  effective  controls,  based  on 
common standards, arc applied by all Member States on exports of controlled goods from 
the Community. 
J() 
Council  Regulation (EC) No  3381/94 of 19  December 1994  setting up a Community regime  for  the 
control of exports of dual-usc goods,  as  amended by  Council  Regulation (EC)  No  837/95 of I  0 
April  1995, OJ  L 367 of 31  December 1994 and OJ  L 90 of 21  April  1995. 
Council Decision 94/942/CPSP of 19  December 1994 on the joint action adopted by the Council on 
the  basis  of Article J .3  of the  Treaty on European  Union concerning the  control of exports of 
dual-usc goods, as amended by Council Decision 95/127/CFSP of 10  April  1995 and by Council 
Decision 95/128/CFSP of 10  April  1995,  OJ  L 367 of 31  December  1994  and  OJ  L 90 of 21 
April  1995. 
26 Two key features of the integrated system are: 
•  a  common  list or dual-use  goods and  technologies suhjed to  export  control  by  all 
Member States as well as a list of  destination countries; 
•  common criteria to  be applied by all  Member States when determining whether or not 
to authorize exports from the Community. 
This  system  is  part  of the  crf(Jrt  of the  international  community  to  rcinf(Jrcc  ami 
coordinate export controls over sensitive items.  In  particular, 28 countries, among which 
all EU Member States, agreed in December I 995 on the establishment of the "Wassenaar 
arrangement".  This arrangement succeeds the COCOM regime as regards export controls 
for arms and dual-usc goods.  There are obvious links between this arrangement and the 
El J system, which will call fi1r an adaptation of the Ell common list of  dual-usc goods. 
In  such a sensitive and complex area where internal market, trade,  foreign and security 
policy interests converge, the common export control system cannot be applied overnight. 
Consequently,  a  transitional  period  is  f(Jrescen  to  ensure  that  the  system  works 
effectively. It will he used to strengthen, where necessary, the control systems or Member 
States and to reinfi1rce administrative cooperation between the competent authorities. 
The new system provides for a clear identification (ami a common list) of dual-use goods 
and  technologies and  serves as  a  basis  for  the  reduction,  and  ultimate elimination, of 
policy differences between Member Statcs.Thc fact that an export licence issued by one 
Member State is  presently valid throughout the  Union,  facilitates joint export projects 
between companies established in the Community. 
The  creation  of  a  common  regime  for  dual-usc  export  controls  is  an  important 
improvement  in  the  regulatory  framework  for  the  European  dcfcncc-rclatcd  industry 
which  will  facilitate  structural  adjustments  thereby  increasing  companies' 
compctitivcncss.Thercfore the whole system has  to  be  implemented cfTectively.  When 
making new proposals for a common regime, the Commission will take into account the 
ruling of the European Court of Justice in  case C-83/94 that dual-usc goods fall  within 
the scope of the common commercial policy defined by Article 113. 
4.2.3  Import duties on military equipment 
The  common  customs  tariff provides  lor  the  application  of customs  duties  to  most 
military or dual-usc civil  and military equipment imported from  third countries.  Only 
certain  products  benefit  from  specific  exemptions,  generally  as  a  result  of GATT 
negotiations.  Individual  exemptions  from  duties  have  also  been  granted  under 
preferential  arrangements with certain third countries,  such as  the  members of EfT  A. 
However,  other military  equipment,  and  dual-usc  products  arc  in  principle  subject to 
customs duties, although the level of those duties has been  lowered considerably in  the 
course of  multilateral trade negotiations. 
It  is against this background that the Commission submitted a proposal to the Council in 
19gg  for  a  regulation  temporarily  suspending  import  duties  on  certain  weapons  and 
military equipment II_  The aim was a uniform Community response to national defence 
II  COM(88  )502 final - OJ C 265, 12.1 0.19RS. p.9. 
27 procurement  requirements  which  had  hitherto  resulted  in  certain  Member  States 
unilaterally granting exemptions from custom duties.  The Commission considered then, 
and still docs, that the tariff arrangements f(lr  imported products, even military or dual-
usc equipment, arc the sole responsibility of the Community and that Article 28 of the 
Treaty  therefore  constitutes  the  only  permissible  legal  basis  for  granting  autonomous 
suspensions.  In  this respect,  the existence of differing national approaches, apart from 
not  being  f(JLmded  in  Community  law,  is  incompatible with  the  very  principles of the 
Customs Uni<m and the Internal Market. 
The scope of the  proposal  for  a  regulation  was defined with the aim of establishing a 
balance  between  the  desire  to  facilitate  access  by  national  armed  forces  to  the  most 
technologically advanced equipment and the need to take account of the interests of the 
Community arms industry.  It  therefore covers equipment which is  military "by nature", 
and parts thereof  During discussions in the Council, a number of Member States asked 
for the list to he extended to certain equipment which would necessarily imply not only 
verifying that importation of this dual-usc equipment with duties suspended is not likely 
to disturb the balance mentioned above but also defining what is meant by "military use" 
in their regard. 
These discussions could be resumed within the overall context of this communication in 
order to establish a list of products benefiting from duty suspensions which is most suited 
to  the  various  objectives of a  European  defence  policy.  This  will  also  contribute,  as 
proposed by the Commission since 1988, to resolve outstanding difliculties, referred to 
above. 
4.2.4  Tntdc relations 
The development of a  European defence equipment market, to  the extent that it  would 
lead to greater sci f-suf'ficiency in  di ffercnt market segments, has potentially far-reaching 
implications  for  relations with  third  countries, and  particularly with  the  United  States, 
which is the main third-country supplier of  arms to the European Union Member States. 
Exploitation  of the  Community  dimension  in  defence  procurement  docs  not  imply 
unilateral opening at Community level of  the defence market to third-country suppliers. 
Because of the  exceptions in  the  multilateral  trade  regime,  including the  Government 
Procurement Agreement (GPA) concluded in  the  framework of the  WTO, competitive 
tendering  docs  not  yet  apply  to  purchases  of defence-related  material  by  our trading 
partners. Every Member State will remain free to consider if bids received from non-EU 
firms should be examined. 
Negotiations should be undertaken in order to lay down the conditions under which third-
country suppliers could enjoy, in· relation to  public procurement and other market access 
issues,  the  same  rights  as  Community  suppliers  in  the  armament  sector,  based  on 
comparable and effective access to the markets of  those countries for EU suppliers, whilst 
respecting each party's security interests. 
28 5. Conclusions: 
The Commission notes that matters concerning the production of  and trade in armaments 
arc linked to defence and foreign-policy considerations of  Member States and to progress 
in  the  development of a  European  security  and  defence  identity.  On  the  other  hand 
securing a  competitive  European  delcnce-related  industry  is  also a  precondition  f(>r  a 
European security and dele  nee identity. 
There  is  thercl<>re  an  urgent  need  l<>r  rccogr11tron  of  the  state  of  health  of  the 
delcnce-rclatcd industry since, if this is not  l(lllowed hy tangible action, there is  a danger 
or aggravation or the situation, leading to  massive job losses and the disappearance or 
technological skills, with serious repercussions in the civil sector. 
Numerous  questions,  particularly  concerning  the  demand  side  ( li.1r  example, 
harmonization of operational requirements) can only he discussed within the framework 
of the  preparations  l()r  a  European  security  and  delcnce  identity.  In  the  short  term, 
however, the CFSP provides mechanisms and  procedures which could smooth the way 
li.>r urgent measures. 
Many other questions, particularly with an impact on the competitiveness of businesses, 
can he answered within the European Community framework. 
In  l~1ct a coherent range of Community instruments is  available li.>r  the establishment of 
unilied markets and competitive industries. The speeilicity of this industry can be taken 
into account adequately when implementing the current instruments. 
The action proposed in  this document could  usefully be complemented by measures in 
the  framework  of the  Western  European  Union,  in  particular  the  establishment of a 
European Armaments Agency referred to in  the WEU Declaration of I 0 December I 99 I. 
The  Council  is  requested  to  give  its  opinion  on  the  l(>regoing  analysis  and  on  the 
suggestions concerning the contribution by the Community instruments. 
In the light of  the Council's work, the Commission plans to take the appropriate action in 
the form of  specific proposals or other suitable measures. 
29 II  ANNEX 
Table 1  *:  Militury expenditure, in cnnstnnt price figures, 1985-1994 
Figures are in US $m., at I 990 prices and exchange-rates. 
I'JX5  19!!6  I'JX7  I'JXX  19!!9  1990  I  9'11  1992  1993  1994 
North America 
Canada  11.014  11.233  11.4XX  I(.(,:! I  11.536  11.547  10:413  10.4!!2  10.433  10.151 
IJSA  313.307  335.04!!  :n 1.215  323.!!60  320.427  306. 170  26!!.994  2!!4.116  269111  252.358 
l·:ur"t"' 
lklginm  4.7X'J  4.'JX4  5.017  4.1\01.  4.Tn  4  .<.44  4.57')  1.7W  1.571  1.549 
lknrnark  2.1tl.1  2.520  2.1tlt2  2.714  2.MX  2Ni0  2.1t'J7  2.MX  2N'i1  2.1tOX 
,  .. rillll:l:  W.91X  41.0X I  42.2X4  -12.24:1  42.7'H  42.5X'J  42.X75  ·11.502  ·11.052  ·11.235 
( inrnany  3X.X24  39.XX9  40.570  40.242  40. 1411  42.320  .l'J.21 (,  J7HJ7  .l.l.·IXIt  .li.25X 
( irl:l:Cl:  -1.524  .1.xr. 1  .1.1!5(,  4.07!!  :l.XI'J  :l.XI•:l  .l.61J3  .l.XOX  .l.716  3.77X 
Italy  I'J.53X  20.IX7  22NJ'J  24.113  24.304  23 .  .176  2:1.7()(,  2:1.()()4  2:1.1!!7  23.492 
l.uxl:mhourg  74  7X  X'J  I o  I  <)]  97  107  Ill  102  110 
Ndhcrlands  7.350  7.461  7.598  7.561  7.63(,  7.421  7.16 I  7.0XX  6.548  6.263 
Norway  3.339  3.234  3.442  3.279  3.369  3.395  3.293  3.569  3.385  3.523 
Portugal  1.336  1.504  1.563  1.73!!  1.824  1.!!75  1.925  1.977  1.914  1.948 
Spain  9.05!!  8.827  9.995  9.345  9.668  9.053  8.775  8.113  8.823  8.141 
Turkey  4.011  4.532  4.316  3.802  4.398  5.315  5.463  5.747  6.355  6.173 
IJK  43.549  42.867  42.561  40.646  40.792  39.776  41.0!!7  37.141  36.312  35.055 
Austria  1.644  1.726  f.(J( 2  1.54(,  1.622  1.542  1.550  1.507  1.502  1.513 
Finland  I.X2(,  1.975  I.<JX9  2.0X5  2.058  2.116  2.447  2.499  2.356  2.167 
lrdand  556  571  53)  530  525  5%  623  (,17  592  613 
Swcdl:n  5.21<1  5.3X7  5.4')1)  5.573  5.7t.2  5.901)  5.5 110  5.3'J2  5.273  5.260 
IT  I  XO.X.B  IX2.'J21  18X.527  IX7.321  ll!X.422  I  X7.X27  I X5.951  176.X56  171.0X7  173.1(·3 
Note : This series is based on the data given in the local currency series, dcllated to  1990 price levels 
and converted into dollars at 1990 period-average exchange-rates.  I  ,ocal consumer price indices (CPJ) 
arc taken as  f~tr as possible from lntcrnation Financial Statistics (IFS) (International Monetary fund : 
Washington, DC).  For the most recent year, the CPI is an estimate on the first 6-10 months of  the year. 
Period-average exchange-rates arc taken as  f~tr as possible from  I  FS. 
* From SIPRI Y  carbook I  995. pp. 440-441 
30 Major wc~tpon procurement cxpcntliturc, 19H3-92 
Figures are in  US Sm, at constant (I <)<)J) prices 
I'JlD  I'JX-1  I'JX"i  I'>XIt  I'JX7  I'JXX  I  'JX'J  I  ')')0  I  CJCJ I  19'J2 
Nnrlll.-llllf'I"WII 
( ·an;ula  ~ I  flO  2. 1'\0  !..22!t  !.  ~~~  2.'\ltX  2  ..  ~21  ~~. I I I  2.12'1  .~.o:!o  2 0) I 
I JSA  ltX.Itl.'i  711'112  X.l'J'J7  'JO  lfl'i  'J (  11ft (  X·I.'J'ilt  X  1.271  7') .l.\7  7·1.7.">7  hh. (.(() 
I-."111"(}/IC' 
lldJ•.iuur  705  lt·1lt  ltl.'i  It :'ill  Mt'1  5X.1  ,17-1  :m  .17')  .122 
lknruark  -11X  11 It  J:'i7  .111')  .l'JJ  JX7  H1  .1'J I  1(22  4.10 
hallc.:c  •u.u  . 'H'JI  '!.XXX  IIUO"i  11.235  11.057  11..1•17  10.1!15  10.077  'J.X{,IJ 
(ic.:nllally  7.XX1  7.XOS  7.X25  X.I'JI  X.21X  7.X26  7.6X5  7.545  4.347  3.562 
Cin:o:cc  (,3J  724  6XI  634  (,)l<)  CJX7  X70  X  59  7TJ  X2X 
Ita  I~  3.6·12  3.505  ].941>  3.942  4')')4  5.075  5.112  4.202  3.967  ].247 
Ltr:\o:mhourg  I  I  3  2  3  3  4  4  6  5 
:\o:thcrlands  1.700  1.774  1.739  1.53 I  1.367  1.561  1.359  1.344  1.130  1.208 
Norway  637  527  X34  66X  70·1  619  X3X  769  727  1146 
Portugal  76  (>C)  4X  104  173  200  23!!  212  1110  131 
Spain  I.CJ70  2.5')(  1.5X I  2.1(>1\  2.565  2.00')  I.X3R  1.214  1.17(,  1.492 
Tmkc.:y  411  51CJ  573  11<17  1.0 I  0  XXX  7X5  1.103  1.2117  1.48!! 
lJK  11.41>7  12.263  12.259  11.505  I 1.001\  I  0.81\2  'J.575  7.798  !!.118  7.359 
European NATO 
Total  .1'J.I X'J  iJIUD  -JO.:WJ  iJO.X'H  1 11.021  '12.0.\X  iJO.'U>X  J(J.427  32.5!!7  30.7X7 
NAT< I lola I  I  O'J'JD  II'J.I2:'i  12ft.572  1.\ I.Y'i1  I \7 O'iO  12'>.511[  127.0)2  1178'J2  IO'UM  98.971) 
H · ruemhn 
o:mmlrics  .IX.I~H  .I'J. II '1  .lX'JI>"i  .1'Hir.  111 .. 1.10  10 'i70  IX xr.s  .1-1.571  .l0.5'J I  28470 
Sources : NATO, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO lklcncc (NATO : Brussels, annual); 
author's calculations.  Figures for France arc based on national data. 
31 Ell imports and exports of major conventional weapons, 1984-93 
Trt.:nd-indicator values, as expressed in  mio {  JS  $,at constant (I 990) prict.:s 
El J imports  World total  World total 
I <JX)  2.12()  l/).711  8.514 
I  <JX(>  1.11 X  44.11 X  X.OOI 
I 'JX7  2.<J42  4(>.]77  7.172 
1988  4.1(>2  38.585  (>.129 
I'>R'J  4.827  37.798  7.6% 
I  C)<)()  J.X£>5  :W.891  (,.1 (,() 
1991  5.4(J]  25.527  5.(>]7 
1992  (>. I 00  24.77(>  4.611 
I <J93  3.7(>6  24.494  5.108 
I  <)C)4  3.7(>6  21.725  (J.548 
Sm1r.r~:  SIPRI  Yearhook  I<J'J5, p 510-511 
T:!l!lc 4:  Imports by Ell Member States of Ma.ior Conventional Weapons, 1988-92 
(in millions of llS dollars at conshmt 1990 prices) 
Supplier:  lJSA  F  () 
necipient 
BeiJ.:iUm  709  54 
Denm a rl>  204  12  49 
( ;ermany  4.279  (J7 
( ;n~el·e  1.109  1.3(J5  <JX7 
Spain  1.040  372  30 
France  1.577 
Ireland  23 
Italy  <194  17  5X 
Nethl•rlands  1.734  14 
Portugal  449  36  X36 
lJK  2.074  121  32 
Total ElJ  12  17.R92  2.0.t4  2.006 
lJSA  J  429 
* or\\  ll icll  at  kast $  12R  Ill io  rrom  11011-Ll J COlllltrics 
S!!Jrcc:  SIPRI Yearbook  1994 
I  NL  UK  Others  Total 
(,!)  102  933 
2X6  43  5% 
32  xo  15  4.473 
15  254  2tl  24tl  6.197 
l2fl  Jl)  I S'J  3.747 
13  ](J  1.626 
3  30  16  71 
119  688 
3  13  1.765 
43  10  1.374 
33  65  2.326 
213  362  465  R12  23.795 











21.725 Critical tcchnolo~ics 
Criticnl tcchnnlo~ics  l>ual-usc  NATO allies 
I  Semiconductor materials and microelectronic circuits  v  2 
2  Soflware producihility  v  2 
"  Parallel computer architectures  v  2  -' 
4  Machine intelligence and robotics  v  3 
5  Simulation and modeling  v  3 
()  Photonics  v  2 
7  Sensitive radars  v  2 
X  Passive sensors  2 
I)  Signal processing  v  2 
10  Signature control  2 
I I  Weapon sytem environment  v  3 
12  Data fusion  v  2 
13  Computational fluid dynamics  v  2 
14  1\ i  r-hreathi ng propulsion  v  3 
I 5  Pulsed power  2 
1  ()  llypervclocity projectiles  2 
17  lligh-energy density materials  3 
IS  ('(Jmposite materials  v  3 
19  Superconductivity  v  2 
20  Biotechnology materials and processes  v  3 
Capability to contribute to the technology : 
4  Signilicantly ahead in some niches of technology 
"  Capable of making major contributions  _) 
2  Capable of  making some contributions 
I  Unlikely to make any immediate contribution 
,\'OUR( 'E: Adapted.from (Hfic:e  £!/'Teduwlogy Assessment,  /990 
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CHART 2:  Exports of Major Conventional Weapons 
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Library of  Congr~o:'>'>. Wao;ilington  D.C.  I'J'J4, pp X7-XX 
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35 List of concentmtion operations with Community dimension in the defence industcy• which have 
tal\cn place since the "Merger" regulation took effect 2 
Reference  Companies  Nationaly of  Activities  The status with 
N° of  involved  companies  involved  regard to 
operation  involved  "Merger" 
regulation 
IV/M.17  MBB/ Aerospatiale  RFA/France  Helicopters  approved on 
25.2.91 
IV/M.86  Thomson/Pi lkington  France/UK  Optronics  approved on 
23.10.91 
IV/M.272  Matra/Cap Gemini Sogeti  France/France  Defence  approved on 
informatics  17.3.93 
IV/M.318  Thomson/Short  France/UK  Missiles  approved on 
14.4.93 
IV/M.275  Aerospatiale/SNPE  France/France  Missiles engines  not notified under 
art.223 
IV/M.527  Thomson/Deutsche  France/Germany  Propulsion  approved on 
Aerospace  systems for  2.12.94 
missiles 
IV/M.528  British Aerospace!VSEL  UK/UK  Military  not achieved, not 
shipbuilding  notified under 
art.223 
IV/M.S29  GECIVSEL  UK/UK  Military  not notified under 
shipbuilding  art.223 
IV/M.S71  CGI*/Dassault  France**  /France  Defence  approved on 
informatics  24.3.95 
IV/M.598  Daimler Benz/Karl Zeiss  FRG/FRG  Optronics  approved on 
27.6.95 
IV/M.620  Thomson/Teneo/1 ndra  France/Spain  Defence  approved on 
electronics  22.8.95 
•  Subsidiary of  d'lllM 
• •  US for the parent company headquarters 
Only includes operations involving solely or principally production of military material.  One can find the same number of 
operations partially concerning defence material. 
Council regulation (EEC) n°4064/89 of  21  December 1989, on the control of concentrations between undertakings, came into effect 
on 21  September 1990.  Only major concentrations with Community dimension are covered by the regulation and these are defined 
in terms of the turnover of the undertakings involved (sec Art I of Regulation). 
36 